Provide two separate responses for David & Daniel comment:
Worksheet 1: For your step to your NAI 63 is something that I mentioned as well on my worksheet for the Battery L. Something I mentioned in my worksheet is that the Battery L should be disrupted prior to the Air assault and surface landings. Since our EFST toward the battery is to facilitate the landings, I recommended the COA change to be conditions based versus time based. Meaning the surface and Air landings would occur with the notification of the Battery being disrupted. Your graphic was mor detailed and incorporated more TAIs than my own. I do think your idea of having NAIs along the avenues of approach as well as your choice to place TAIs along MSRs are a good decision. I like your decision point 1. Mine is similar except it is in the vicinity of the Battery and once the battery has been effectively disrupted that then sets conditions for the landings instead of continuing with the landing and then delaying in the enemy territory while the enemy still has the ability to affect the friendly force with battery. I also had a very similar recommended CCIR in this worksheet
Worksheet 2: I agree with your location of NAI 66 and High payoff targets. I like your recommended CCIR in this worksheet whereas I accidently recommended a CCIR that was already on the list. On that note I should have listed all the CCIRs like you did in step two of this worksheet.
Worksheet 3: For this worksheet the big decision is where to place the Reserve. You decided Yellow Beach where I chose White. Reference my response on Celeste for my decision but I don’t know the right answer. With that I like how you delineated decision point 4 for that reason.
WG WS #1: The only differences I see in our friendly actions are miniscule. I pulled all of my friendly actions from the sync matrix to cover what each warfighting function would entail during these separate wargames. That being said, we have the same information just different verbiage. I identified EFSTs that we already drew up for the fires portion, which I think is important as it allows us to verify effectiveness of such EFSTs. We both added NAI 63 to cover Btry L’s position to prevent that continued engagement at the beaches. I then added NAIs 64 & 65 to cover any southwest movement of K/3/3 to counter the assault at Yellow Beach. Our HPTs in this WG are the same – PLZ-89s and Type 92 APCs. I think your TAIs overall make sense, however, to be more specific on this WG WS – I added TAIs B & C to cover the two main avenues of approach for K/3/3 to displace and move to counter the assault at Yellow Beach. My TAI A covers Btry L and any displacement they may engage. We both added two DPs. DP1 is similar in that the MEU commander will be forced to decide to continue the assault at Yellow Beach or to delay. My DP2 involves committing the Reserve if K/3/3 is able to clear my TAI B or C. Our friendly counteractions are similar, I only added to the logistics piece that we should delay the SE3 dets from landing in trace and wait until the ME establishes FBHLs. I also added a recommended CCIR to confirm any K/3/3 movement west towards Yellow Beach, which would trigger TAIs and DPs.
WG WS #2: No significant comments on friendly actions across warfighting functions. We both added NAI 66 on this scenario to cover the K/3/3 movement towards LZ3. I see you added NAI 63 to cover any enemy movement toward LZ2 as result of the deception efforts, which I think is a good add as I identified LZ2 as an alternate landing site if the enemy is able to delay our landing at LZ3 effectively. The only addition I would make to your HPT is the FN-6 AA man portable systems that the enemy is employing to disrupt the assault support mission. I added TAI D on this one to cover any K/3/3 movement to further disrupt operations at LZ3 as this provides opportunity to destroy K/3/3 HPTs while moving in the open. I think our DP on this one works to the same effect. I added this as DP4 for the MEU commander to further delay the insert or shift the landing to LZ2, which in hindsight is likely a tactical decision that will require input from the MAATF commander. Regarding friendly counteractions, I added two CCIRs to address K/3/3 moving north toward LZ3 which triggers my DP4 and the second to address K/3/3 moving east past LZ3 as this would be telling of them moving to reinforce I/3/3 against the White Beach assault.
WG WS #3: In WG 3 we again identified the same friendly actions. I added NAI 67 in this one to locate L/3/3, which is where K/3/3 would be moving IOT establish combined defenses against the assault at Yellow Beach. Tied to this action, I added TAI E to cover the main avenue of approach south that K/3/3 would utilize to reinforce L/3/3. This provides an opportunity for the MAATF to exploit HPTs in the open and prevent any link-up of the two companies. One other key HPT that Zach identified here, and we both missed is the enemy C2. If we cover the enemy C2 with an NAI this also provides an opportunity to neutralize that capability disrupting enemy ability to link-up. In this WG I added two DPs – DP4 for MAATF to pursue K/3/3 after withdrawing from LZ3 and DP5 for the MEU commander to commit the Reserve if K/3/3 does make link-up with L/3/3, at which point the enemy would have us at a 2:1 ratio IVO Yellow Beach. With this, I added one recommended CCIR to confirm any K/3/3 movement west of PL Wild which may indicate enemy forces mustering a combined defense against the assault through Yellow Beach. To address this CCIR and action, I added EFST 7 to disrupt any K/3/3 maneuver toward Yellow Beach or L/3/3 positions.